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Abstract The paper presents a general formal framework representing the role of
balancing of values in interpretation of statutory rules. The model developed here is
an extension of the model of teleological interpretation, where a given interpretive
outcome is justiﬁed if it satisﬁes a given goal (or a set of goals). Herein, a richer
argumentative structure is discussed: an interpretive proposition concerning the in-
terpretation of a statutory condition is justiﬁed if it is in accordance with the proper
balance of applicable legally relevant values.
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1. Introduction
The topic of balancing of values and its role in legal reasoning has been the point of
interest in AI and Law for more than two decades now. However, so far the fundamental
concepts and inference patterns related to balancing have not been accounted for in a
formal framework in the context of statutory interpretation. This paper aims to ﬁll this
gap. The paper does not deal with the structure of the balancing itself, but it argues for a
basic conceptual scheme that creates the background for any instance of balancing-based
interpretation. The results of our work may be useful for the development of rule-based
systems involving the notion of interpretation.
In legal literature the topic of balancing has been initially associated with the notion of
legal principles [7], [1], [2], [10], [3]. In the domain being the scope of this paper – that
is, statutory interpretation – the issue in question is whether a given rule should be in-
terpreted in certain manner and, as a consequence, applied to the given state of affairs.
Therefore, the objects being valuated with respect to relevant values are states of affairs
with attached consequences following from the rule in question, and, for comparison, the
same states of affairs without such consequences (similarly to [12] and [8]). As far as
the criteria of acceptance are concerned, two aspects have to be distinguished. First, no
legally relevant value should be realized below its core threshold [10]. Second, it is an
open question whether we are obligated to adopt the interpretation which yields the opti-
mal level of balancing of values, or is it acceptable to adopt any outcome which satisﬁes
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a certain valuation threshold. Our thesis is that this threshold of minimal acceptability
is typically ﬁxed by means of interpretive propositions based on balancing. Our paper
is based on the idea which can be seen as the development and discussion of the teleo-
logical interpretation concept from [12], but also as an implementation of the concept of
goal and relationship between goal and value from [11].
2. The model
We will begin with a summarized discussion of the basic concepts of the model of tele-
ological reasoning from [11], further referred to as the GVR model:
Let S = {sx,sy,sz, ...} be a ﬁnite, non-empty set of propositions. Each proposition rep-
resents one state of affairs. We have to separate the two meanings of the word value: a
value may be understood as a concept or as a process: (1) Value as an abstract concept
which allows for the estimation of a particular action or a state of affairs and inﬂuences
one’s behaviour. V is a set of values: V = {v1,v2, . . .vn} (2) Valuation as a process of
estimation of the level of extent to which a particular states of affairs s promotes a value
vi. By vi(s) we denote the extent to which s promotes a value vi. By V (S) we denote
the set of all valuations of all states of affairs. By V i(S) we denote the set of all possible
extents to which a value vi from set V may be promoted by any possible state of affairs
s ∈ S. A partial order Oi = (;V i(S)) represents the relation between extents to which
values are promoted.In real-life reasoning people do not rely only on a comparison of the
levels of promotion of one value; usually, they compare the levels of promotion of var-
ious values. Theoretically speaking, they are incompatible, but practically, people com-
pare not only the levels of promotion of various values, but also the levels of promotion
of various sets of values. By V Z ⊂ V we denote a subset (named Z) of a set of values
V which consists of values: vi,vj , ... ∈ V Z . By V si ⊂ V we will denote a set of values
promoted by a state of affairs si.
By V Z(sn) we denote a set of estimations of the levels of promotion of values con-
stituting set V Z by a state of affairs sn ∈ X . If V Z = {vz,vt}, then V Z(sn) =
{vz(sn),vt(sn)}. A partial order OR = (;2V (S)) represents a preference relation be-
tween various sets of values and various states of affairs: V Z(sn)V Y (sm) means that
the extent to which values from set V Z are promoted by a state of affairs sn is preferred
to the extent to which values from set V Y are promoted by a state of affairs sm.
The discussion of relationships between orders OR and O as well as the mechanism of
deriving order OR is presented in the [11].
Deﬁnition 1 (Legal rule) Let R= {rv, rz, ...} be a set of legal rules. Each rule is a pair
〈sx, cx〉, where sx is the condition of the rule and cx is the conclusion of the rule.
If a state of affairs sa fulﬁlls the conditions of the rule, then the conclusion leads to the
change of the state of affairs into sx+c (where sx,sx+c ∈ S).
Basing on [10] we assume that the grounds for evaluation of each interpretation in our
model will be goals in the form of minimal extents to which a given set of values should
be promoted. Thus established concept of goal remains complacent with the idea of
abstract goal from [11]:
Deﬁnition 2 (Goals) Goals are represented by the minimal acceptable extents to which
a particular state od affairs promotes a given set of values:
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Let GA= {ga1,ga2, ...} be a set of goals. By vnmin(ga) we denote the minimal extent
to which the promotion of a value vn satisﬁes a goal ga. By vn(s1)  vnmin(ga) we
denote that a goal ga is satisﬁed by a state of affairs s1 with respect to a value vn. By
vn ∈ ga we denote that the minimal extent of a given value vn is declared in a goal ga
(note that ∈ is different that ∈). The abovementioned deﬁnition of goals represents the
idea of protection of the core of values; the deﬁned goals correspond to core thresholds as
discussed in [10]. Other types of goals are also relevant in law, but the minimal thresholds
are particularly important, deﬁning the minimal acceptability of statutory interpretation
statements.
Although like Sartor we assume that the foundation for setting goals are values whose
promotion is recommended by principles (goal norms).
Deﬁnition 3 (Interpretation) The binary operator • represents interpretation of the
principle’s conditions (the operator • was extensively discussed in [4] and [5]). By
st •sx (where st,sx ∈ S) we mark that a state of affairs st fulﬁlls conditions sx.
It should be pointed out that in our model we introduced a differentiation between the
current state of affairs and the state of affairs expressed in the rule’s premises. It results
from the fact that in practice the description of the actual state of affairs very rarely
literally matches the premises of the rule; most frequently it is somehow interpreted,
often by the so-called intermediate legal concepts.
Deﬁnition 4 (Interpretive Statements) All complex expressions of the elements of set
S and constructed by means of the relation word • will be referred to as Interpretive
Statements.
Interpretive Statements play a role of intermediaries between the factual description of a
given state of affairs and the states of affairs expressed in the conditions of legal rules.
The crucial question is this context is whether the conditions of a rule should be inter-
preted in such a way to encompass the current fact situation, or to the contrary. Interpre-
tive canons [9] serve as arguments for justiﬁcation of this or another Interpretive State-
ments concerning the conditions of the rule in question. However, these canons may also
be looked at as heuristics: simpliﬁed rules approximating the actually justiﬁed Interpre-
tive Statements. If we agree that law is a system designed for the sake of realization of
important social values, then we may assume that the set of “actually justiﬁed” Interpre-
tive Statements follow from the balancing of those socially relevant values. Note that we
do not claim the existence of a unique “right” interpretation of any legal rule [7].
Let us now consider application of a given rule ra〈sa, ca〉 to the state of affairs sm. In
order to justify this application, we have to be able to show that sm • sa (for the sake
of simplicity we do not consider the problem of analogous application of rules here).
Typically, justifying this inference step will involve at least one layer of intermediary
concepts.
Let us deﬁne the set IS (ra,sm) as the set of Interpretive Statements concerning apppli-
cation of ra to sm.
Deﬁnition 5 (Positive and Negative Interpretive Arguments) An Interpretive State-
ment ∈ IS(ra,sm) is a Positive Interpretive Statement (PINS) if and only if it justiﬁes
application of ra to sm. An Interpretive Statement ∈ IS(ra,sm) is a Negative Inter-
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pretive Statement Statement (NENS) if and only if it justiﬁes non-application of ra to
sm.
Deﬁnition 6 (Goal-admissible Interpretive Statement) An interpretive statement ∈
IS(ra,sm) is goal-admissible with respect to goal ga warranting the realization of value
vn if and only if:
a. vn(sm) vnmin(ga) if the interpretive statement is aNENS (goal- admissible
NENS)
b. vn(sm+ca) vnmin(ga) if the interpretive statement is a PINS (goal - admis-
sible PINS)
If an interpretive statement is not goal-admissible, then it is goal-inadmissible.
It is worthwhile to delimit the set of states of affairs in which each Interpretive Statement,
concerning application of legal rules R, is goal-admissible with respect to the value vn
and the goal ga, setting its minimal required realization. We will refer to this set as the
Model of Interpretive Statements with regard to value vn and goal ga.
Deﬁnition 7 (Model of Interpretive Statements – single value) . Let IS be the given
set of Interpretive Statements, vn the value in question and ga – the goal protecting the
minimal realization of the value.Mod(IS)vn,ga is the set of all states of affairs in which
all given Interpretive Statements are goal-admissible.
Intuitively, the model of interpretive statements is the set of all states of affairs where the
degree of realization of a value is always greater than the minimal threshold, taking into
account the rules applicable to these states of affairs and interpretation of these rules.
A given state of affairs may not belong to the model of interpretive statements if this
state of affairs is untypical or novel (hard cases), or if the legislation is poorly drafted,
enabling goal-inadmissible interpretations.
Conversely, we may deﬁne the set of all goal-admissible interpretive statements for a
given set of states of affairs, taking into account value vn and goal ga. We will refer to
this set as the Interpretive Theory (INTh) of a set of states of affairs.
Deﬁnition 8 (Interpretive Theory of States of Affairs – single value) Let S be the
given set of States of Affairs, vn the value in question and ga – the goal protecting the
minimal realization of the value.
INTh(S)vn,ga is the set of all Interpretive Statements that are goal-admissible in any
of the states of affairs in S.
The operator INTh(S)vn,ga separates the goal-admissible from the goal-inadmissible
interpretive statements, for a given set of states of affairs, taking into account the realiza-
tion of vn with regard to ga.
Let us now combine the two operators to obtain the notion of Value-based Consequence
of the given set of Interpretive Statements.
Deﬁnition 9 (Value-Based Consequence) Value-based consequence of the set of Inter-
pretive Statements V Cn(IS)vn,ga is deﬁned as INThvn,ga(Mod(IS)vn,ga), that is,
the set of all Interpretive Statements that are goal-admissible in all non-hard cases.
The above deﬁnitions may be generalized to encompass sets of values and goals. Intu-
itively, V Cn(IS)vn,ga deﬁnes a relatively narrow subset of Interpretive Statements.
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3. Argumentation schemes
We have already noticed ([9], [4]) that interpretive statements are justiﬁed by means of
interpretive canons, usually expressed as argumentation schemes which are forms of ar-
gument which represent stereotypical patterns of human reasoning.
Below we present two interpretive canons: the ﬁrst one justiﬁes a positive interpretive
statement on grounds that it fulﬁll the goal set by the legislator; the second one consti-
tutes a demonstration of balancing-based interpretive conﬂict solution.
IAS1 The ﬁrst type of argumentation scheme: every positive interpretive statement
which fulﬁlls the goal is justiﬁed. The given data are: a goal gak, a current state of affairs
(sm), a legal rule rl, and a Positive Interpetive Statement: sm •sl. If after the application
of rule (sm+c), sm will promote all values indicated by goal gak to a no lesser degree
than the minimum, then the interpretive statement sm •sl will be justiﬁed:
gak
sm
rl = 〈sl, c〉
sm •sl ∈ PINS
∀vn∈gakvn(sm+c) vnmin(gak)
sm •sl
IAS2 The second argumentation scheme refers directly to the balancing of values and
is an example of a conﬂict resolution mechanism: there are two exclusive interpretive
statements, both fulﬁlling the set goal, but one of them is preferred because of the val-
ues it promotes: The given data are: a goal gak, a current state of affairs (sm), a legal
rule rl, two interpretive statements sm • sl ∈ PINS and sm  •sl ∈NENS. Both cases
promote values indicated by gak to the extent no lesser than the recommended mini-
mum. If in the context of set V k and after the application of rule (sm+c), sm will be
preferred to interpretation sm  •sl, then the interpretive statement sm • sl will be justi-
ﬁed. The crucial point in the discussion is the list of values V k determining on the basis
of which values the balance should be made. Obviously, not all of the values ought to
be taken into consideration. In previous sections we assumed that our goal (gak) is set
on the basis of the binding legal principles; since they deﬁne the constitutional order, we
believe that they should serve as the foundation of balancing. Therefore we assume that
V k = {vn|vn ∈ gak}.
gak
sm
rl = 〈sl, c〉
sm •sl ∈ PINS





Let us note that the argumentation schemes presented above do not have to lead to the
conclusion concerning uniqueness of the best interpretive sentence (one right answer, see
[9]), because set ordered by the symbol () may not have the greatest element, it may
have more than one maximal elements.
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4. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a general framework which extends the concept of tele-
ological reasoning to represent the role of balancing of values in the context of statu-
tory interpretation. This framework is compatible with the ﬁndings of [10]. We have
also deﬁned certain speciﬁc concepts representing safe interpretive situations, where ex-
plicit balancing is not needed to justify a satisfactory interpretive outcome (the notions
of model of Interpretive Statements, interpretive theory of states of affairs and ﬁnally,
value-based consequence). For situations where actual balancing needs to be made ex-
plicit, we have provided two argumentation schemes.
As for the future work, we intend to: (1) explore the structure of arguments supporting
conclusions encompassing the ordering operators (orders Oi and OR); this line of reser-
ach involves investigations into case-based reasoning structures in statutory interpreta-
tion; (2) apply the framework to model the situation of justiﬁed violation of rules (as in
Bench Capon [6]) and (3) integrate the model into the broader framework modeling the
behaviour of agents interpreting statutes.
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